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In this paper we have introduced and parameterized the concept of “group cohesion” in a 
model of local interaction with a population divided into groups. This allows us to control the 
level of “isolation” of these groups: We thus analyze if the degree of group cohesion is 
relevant to achieve an efficient behaviour and which level would be the best one for this 
purpose. We are interested in situations where there is a trade off between efficiency and 
individual incentives. This trade off is stronger when the efficient strategy or norm is strictly 
dominated, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma or in some cases of Altruism. In our model we have 
considered that agents could choose to be Altruist of Egoist, in fact, they behave as in Eshel, 
Samuelson and Shaked (1998) model. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Eﬃcient norms are often applied in certain social contexts. However, we might
well ask ourselves why eﬃcient norms are chosen over others in processes of
cultural transmission.
In the words of Boyd and Richerson (2002):
"The fact that group eﬃcient norms can persist does not explain
why such norms are widely observed. While punishment and reward
can stabilize group eﬃcient norms, they can also stabilize virtually
any behavior (Fundenberg & Maskin,1986; Boyd &Richerson,1992a).
We can be punished if we lie or steal, but we can also be punished
if we fail to wear a tie or refuse to eat the brains of dead relatives.
Thus, we need an explanation for why populations should be more
likely to wind up at a group eﬃcient equilibrium than one of the
vastly greater number of stable but non-group eﬃcient equilibria.
Put another way, if social diversity results from many stable social
equilibria, then social evolution must involve shifting among alter-
native stable equilibria. Group eﬃcient equilibria will be common
only if the process of equilibrium selection tends to pick out group
eﬃcient equilibria."
There are two diﬀerent kinds of models that focus on these questions: i.e.,
the local-interaction and the group-interaction models.
From the many group-interaction models proposed in the literature, we con-
sider the Group Selection model as the most interesting and commonly used. It
was originally developed by biologists (see Sober and Wilson (1999)) who sup-
posed that the population is segmented into diverse and isolated groups, each
with its own independent dynamic evolution. Being able to consider diverse
groups within the same population allows us to consider parallel but diﬀer-
ent forms evolutions at the same time. This increases the probability that some
groups achieve eﬃciency. One of the problems with these models, however, is the
mechanism employed for explaining the way in which an eﬃcient group succeeds
in spreading its eﬃciency throughout the entire population. The most widely
accepted idea is that there is a sort of "competition” among groups. Thus, the
most eﬃcient groups have the best performance and as such, the most com-
mon mechanism considered is the extinction of the least-eﬃcient groups. These
concepts have already been applied to certain economic issues, (see e.g., Vega-
Redondo, F., (1993) and Sjostrom, T., M. Weitzman (1996) ). However, the
extinction seems to be a too strong mechanism in many contexts. There must
b ea n yo t h e rw a yt os p r e a da ne ﬃcient behavior from a certain group to the
rest of the population.
On the other hand, the literature on local interaction, which is also concerned
with the selection of equilibria, suggests a natural mechanism that could spread
eﬃciency from a local context towards a global eﬃciency, by exploiting the
overlaps that exist among individuals’ neighborhoods. So far, however, thisbranch of the literature has not yet considered the concept of a group being
able to spread eﬃcient behavior around in the same sense as Group Selection
does. Nonetheless, they do consider some vague forms of clustering or grouping,
i.e., there is some kind of structure to the population.
One of the most interesting papers which deal with this topic using a local-
interaction model is the work of Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998). They use
a local-interaction model to exploit the following idea:
If the positive externalities of co-operation (e.g., in a prisoners’ dilemma
game) or altruistic behavior are locally restricted, the local-interaction model
reduces the possibility for other (more distant) players to beneﬁtf r o mc o -
operation. Consequently, co-operators who are surrounded predominantly by
other co-operators, will earn higher payoﬀs than non-co-operators who are sur-
rounded predominantly by other non-co-operators. Reinforced by imitation co-
operation has a better chance of survival. The structure of the population, how-
ever, (which is as presented in Ellison (1993)), has a homogeneous and constant
neighborhood overlap, which precludes the idea of a group with any meaningful
structure.
In Boyd and Richerson (2002) we ﬁnd a preliminary, though just partial
attempt at merging local interaction and group selection. The authors’ goal
is to ﬁnd a mechanism that could spread eﬃcient norms, or “group-beneﬁcial”
norms, as they refer to them. They consider a population that is made-up of
isolated groups in a ring, as in Ellison (1993), except that Ellison considers in-
dividuals, not groups. The individual members of a given group interact among
themselves in a uniform way and there is no internal structure to the group.
Those individuals, who generally learn from the other members of their own
group, also have the probability of learning from their neighboring groups. The
agents play a co-ordination game and the eﬃcient strategy eventually spreads
throughout the entire population, under given values of probability of imitation
and depending on the prevailing payoﬀs. The authors go as far as considering
both inter-group learning and intra-group interaction, (i.e., they consider diﬀer-
ent structures of interaction and observation-imitation), yet they stop short of
considering inter-group interaction as well.
Our model, as the model of Boyd and Richerson (2002), wants to link the
local interaction and the group selection models. However, unlike them, we con-
sider not only inter-group learning, but also inter-group interaction. In fact, we
identify the structure of interaction and the structure of observation-imitation
in the framework of a population that is divided into diverse groups.
Thus, in our model we consider groups in a local interaction model and para-
meterize the degree of isolation of these groups1. To achieve this, we introduce
the concept of group cohesion in a local interaction model and parameterize it.
Indeed, we parameterize the fraction of neighbors that an agent has inside and
outside of his group. This allows us to have two extreme and opposite situ-
ations (and all situations between them) in the same model: i.e., on the one
1The isolation of a group increases when the number of neighbors that group members
have outside of such group decreases.hand, if group-cohesion is maximal, the group remains isolated, which is not
good news, as there would be no way of spreading eﬃciency either to or from
another group. This is the structure in models of group selection, and this is the
reason why these models must consider group extinction. On the other hand, if
group-cohesion is minimal, the very concept of a group is meaningless, groups
are inessential, i.e., a case in which neighborhoods are unaﬀected by groups,
as in the classical local-interaction model presented in Ellison (1993) and other
papers.
Therefore, our model has in one extreme a structure of group selection mod-
els and in the other one a conventional local interaction model similar to Eshel
et al. (1998) , and , of course, all the intermediate situations.
Thus, we are able to introduce restrictions to the spread of any behavior in
such population. The higher is the cohesion of the groups, i.e. the stronger is
the role of the boundaries between groups, the more diﬃcult is the spreading of
any behavior between groups.
Hence, we are thus able to study the relationship between group-cohesion
and the persistence and spread of eﬃcient but dominated strategies, such as
altruism. With such a model, we can now answer questions like:
• Is the spread and persistence of altruism beneﬁted (or damaged) by group-
ing or clustering individuals in a local-interaction model?
• What is the relationship between group-cohesion and the spread of altru-
ism?
We will see that this concept of group plays an important role even in a local-
interaction model. A certain level of fragmentation in the population favours
the persistence and spread of altruism. Speciﬁcally, an intermediate level of
group-cohesion is the best scenario for altruism. Indeed, it is better than the
classical local-interaction scenario, where groups are inessential, and it is better
than a case of almost-isolated groups (i.e., excessive group cohesion).
In the following section, we introduce the model and review the Eshel et
al (1998) model, after which, Section 3 describes the analysis and Section 4
presents some simulations.
2M o d e l
This section is divided into three sub-sections, in the ﬁrst one we describe the
kind of trade-oﬀ between individual incentives and eﬃciency that we consider
in our model. We then describe, in the second sub-section, the structure of the
population and the characteristics of the cohesion function. In the following
sub-section, we specify the payoﬀs ,t h el e a r n i n gr u l ea n dthe dynamics. Finally,
we focus on the special case of a linear cohesion function.2.1 Altruists and Egoists
We consider the same sort of altruistic behavior as the one described in Eshel,
Samuelson and Shaked (1998), but within a diﬀerent population structure. As
our study is closest to the work done by Eshel et al., (1998), we ﬁrst review
t h e i rm o d e la n dt h e ne x p l a i nh o wi td i ﬀers from ours.
The model of Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998)
That behavioral model has two key properties. First, people are
not rational agents who choose utility-maximizing actions. Rather,
they learn which actions work well by imitation. The second prop-
erty is that interactions between individual agents are all local.
An individual may be either an Altruist or an Egoist. An Altruist
provides a public good that supplies one unit of utility to those who
receive its beneﬁts. The net cost of providing the public good for the
A l t r u i s t si sc >0, so that the combination of enjoying the beneﬁts of
his own public good and bearing the cost of its provision reduces the
Altruist’s utility by c. Egoists provide no public goods and support
no costs. They simply enjoy the beneﬁts of the public goods provided
by others.
Time is divided into discrete periods. At the end of each period,
after consuming a public good that is available, and bearing the
provision costs (in the case of Altruists), each agent then decides,
according to a learning rule, whether he wishes to be an Altruist
or Egoist during the next period. Instead of choosing the best re-
sponses, players tend to imitate the strategies of other players who
they have seen earning payoﬀs. When people are faced with a com-
plex situation, they tend to imitate the behavior of others who have
earned high payoﬀs.
Imitation alone, however, does not seem to guarantee the survival
of altruism. Egoists enjoy the same public goods as Altruists do
while they bear none of the costs. As such, Egoists obtain higher
payoﬀs than Altruists and imitation only leads players to become
Egoists. The above argument, however, only holds if the positive
externality of the public good is extended to every agent in the
population. The chance of altruism spreading improves if the public
good is a local public good. This reduces the possibility of other
(more distant) players exploiting co-operation. As a result, Altruists
who are surrounded by other Altruists can earn higher payoﬀst h a n
Egoists who are surrounded primarily by other Egoists. This local
interaction, reinforced by imitation, aﬀords altruism a better chance
of survival.
To be more precise, they introduce a neighbor structure taken
from Bergstrom and Stark(1993) and Ellison (1993). Agents in the
model are located around a circle. Agents interact with his twoimmediate neighbors, i.e. with one agent to his right and one to his
left. When agent i is Egoist, his pay-oﬀ is the number of Altruists
in his neighborhood, however, when agent i is Altruist his pay-oﬀ is
the number of Altruists in his neighborhood minus the cost c.T h e
learning rule is as follows: the agent who learns observes his own pay-
oﬀ and the pay-oﬀ and strategy of each agent in his neighborhood.
He then chooses to be an Egoist if the average pay-oﬀ of the Egoists
in his sample exceeds that of Altruists, and choose to be an Altruist
in the opposite case. If an agent and his neighbors all play the same
strategy, be it Altruists or Egoists, then the agent will continue to
play that strategy.
Regarding the structure of the population, our model is quite diﬀerent from
the ones outlined above. We consider groups in a local-interaction model and we
parameterize the cohesion of these groups. Thus, we parameterize the fraction
of neighbors that any group member has outside and inside of his group. We are
able to introduce restriction to the spread of any behavior in such population.
The higher is the cohesion of the groups, i.e. the stronger is the role of the
boundaries between groups, the more diﬃcult is the spreading of any behav-
ior between groups. As such, we are able to increase or decrease the positive
externality of the public good produced by clusters or groups of Altruists, i.e.,
the extension of that externality. We can therefore study the interaction that
exists between altruism and egoism in diﬀerent scenarios, all with neighborhood
overlaps that allow the natural spread of such behaviors. In a sense, we can con-
trol the degree of the population’s segmentation or fragmentation into groups.
The model thus permits us to study the inﬂuence that the permeability of the
boundary between groups has on the spread of a given pattern of behavior.
Another diﬀerence in our model is that it considers a continuous, rather than a
discrete population.
Regarding the learning rule, if an agent compares average payoﬀsi nh i s
neighborhood, as in Eshel et al. (1998), the weight that this mechanism of
decision place on his own payoﬀs is the same as that placed on the payoﬀso f
the other agents in his neighborhood.
We could increase the weight of the individual agent’s own pay-oﬀ, e.g., by
letting him compare it with the average of the payoﬀs obtained by the other
members of his neighborhood, and obviously, by those who happened to play
the other possible strategy. If this concept were included in the Eshel et al.
model, it would be easy to prove that the altruism has no chance of survival2.
The best response is an extreme case in which the own-pay-oﬀ is the only one
considered. It seems that the more weight the own-payoﬀ has in the decision-
making mechanism, the worst it is for altruism. This seems logical, as the
individual payoﬀs play a more important role in the agent’s decision than the
payoﬀs of the others do. Thus, it is more diﬃcult to learn the positive eﬀects
2We have only proven this statement for the main case studied by Eshel el al., (1998), i.e.,
each agent has two neighborhoods, this is straightforward and immediate to prove. When we
consider larger neighborhoods, however, it seems that Altruism can indeed persist .of following an eﬃcient but dominated strategy like altruism. Since we want to
study the relationship between group-cohesion and the spread of altruism, we
consider the best learning rule for the spreading of altruism, i.e., the Eshel et
al., model. However, to check the robustness of our results, we also consider the
learning rule that compares the average pay-oﬀ with one’s own pay-oﬀ.
2.2 Population structure
Individuals are located on the real line. Let N = {i/i ∈ R} be the
population, a continuum of agents. Thus, each point of the real line represents
an agent. We label the set of agents who are situated between two successive or
immediate integers as a group, so the size of each group is equal to one. As such,
each group has two neighboring groups, one to its left and another to its right.
Consequently, integer numbers on the real line can be considered as boundary
points between two successive groups. We denominate each group according to
its lower integer-boundary, e.g., the group z ∈ Z is Gz =[ z,z +1 ) .
Each individual i in this population has an interaction and a learning neigh-
borhood. The interaction and the learning neighborhood, in this model, are in
fact the same neighborhood. Thus, individual i’s neighborhood is a segment of
the real line which contains the individual i. We consider the length of that
segment to be equal to one, i.e., equal to the size of the group. However, it
does not mean that the group of agent i and the neighborhood of this agent
are the same segment on the real line. We parameterize the position of that
neighborhood with the function f(i):R −→ [0, 1
2] which is called cohesion func-
tion, see Figure 1.F o r e a c h i, the cohesion function f(i) gives the size of the
segment-neighborhood outside his group, i.e., the fraction of i’s neighbors who
are outside i’s group. Next, we deﬁne i’s neighborhood, where bic gives the
greatest integer less than or equal to i.
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Figure 1: This graph represents the real line. The interval between 0 and 1 is the
group G0 =[ 0 ,1),i ti sd e p i c t e di nl i g h tg r e y .T h ea g e n tj belongs to the group G0,
thus j ∈ [0,1). The interaction and learning neighborhood of the agent j is the
interval [j−,j +).Deﬁnition 1 The neighborhood Vi of individual i ∈ R is:
Vi =
½
{j ∈ R / bic − f(i) ≤ j<bic − f(i)+1 } if i ∈ [bic,bic + 1
2)
{j ∈ R / bic + f(i) <j≤ bic + f(i)+1 } if i ∈ [bic + 1
2,bic +1 )
That Vi is agent i’s interaction and learning neighborhood.
Even though our one-dimensional model is quite simple, by using diﬀerent
cohesion functions f(i) we can consider broad and diverse population structures.
We can change the group’s cohesion in many ways. Note that the concept of
group-cohesion within a broader population can be a bit fuzzy (see Wasser-
man and Faust (1994) for several deﬁnitions of cohesion). We now present the
characteristics of the cohesion function.
2.2.1 Characteristic of the cohesion function.
As we consider that all of our groups have the same structure, the function
must be periodic with a period equal to one. Let FractionalPart[i]=|i − bic|
if h = FractionalPart[i] then f(i)=f(h) for all i ∈ R, i.e. f(i)=f(i +1 ) .
Furthemore, since we consider that the group structure is symmetric around
the middle point of the group, the function will be symmetric as well, i.e. f(h)
= f(1 − h) for all h ∈ [0, 1
2].C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e f u n c t i o n f(i) will be fully
characterized by knowing the function f(h) in the interval h ∈ [0, 1
2], because
the function is symmetric and periodic. Thus, we can concentrate on the interval
[0, 1
2].
We also consider that f(1
2)=0 , i.e. the cohesion function does not modify
the neighborhood of the individual who is in the middle of the group, for this
agent, his group and his neighborhood are in fact always the same one. More-
over, we consider f0(h) ≤ 0 for all h ∈ (0, 1
2), i.e. the closer to the center of
the group the individual is, the smaller the part of his neighborhood outside the
group is. Hence, the function f(h) has the maximum value in h =0(boundary
of the group), and the minimum value in h = 1
2 (middle point of the group).
Let x = f(0). This parameter, x, is the maximum distance that an external
neighbor of a group-member can be from the boundary of the group. We name
the parameter x the external depth of the group. On the other hand, let d ∈
(0, 1
2] be the argument of f closest to zero, such that f(d)=0 , i.e., the value
2d gives the number of group members who have neighbors outside the group.
We name the parameter d the internal depth of the group. See Figure 2.
In such a context, we can see the cohesion of the group as the degree of
interrelatedness among the group’s members.
In general, if we have two cohesion functions f1(h) and f2(h) with f1(h) ≥
f2(h) for all h ∈ [0, 1
2] and f1(h) >f 2(h) for some h ∈ [0, 1
2] then f2(h) makes
t h eg r o u p ’ ss t r u c t u r em o r ec o h e s i v et h a nf1(h) does.
With f lineal, i.e. f(h)=x(1 − h
d) for all h ∈ [0, 1
2], a decrease in either
of the parameters d or x obviously causes an increase in the group’s cohesion,
see Figure 2. On the one hand, if x =0then we have isolated groups and
maximum group-cohesion. On the other hand, if x = 1
2 and d = 1
2 then we havea conventional local interaction model with the same constant overlaps among
the neighborhoods, as in Eshel et al[1998]. In this second case, an individual
has the same number of neighbors on the right side as on the left side of his
neighborhood. He is therefore at the mid-point of his neighborhood.
2.3 Payoﬀs, learning rule and dynamic.
As we have explained in the previous section, given a particular cohesion func-
tion f(i) we have a speciﬁc population structure on the real line. In the present
section we deﬁne the individual payoﬀs, learning rule and dynamic in a popu-
lation structure given by a cohesion function f(i).
Time is divided into discrete periods and, as we have already mentioned,
we consider altruistic behavior just as Eshel et al., (1998) do. To be more
precise, in our population structure, we need to deﬁne a state of the system.
Let gt(i):R −→ {0,1} be the state of the system in period t =0 ,1,2... If
gt(i)=1( 0 )the agent i is Altruist (Egoist) during period t.
The position of boundary of i’s neighborhood are i− on the left and i+ on
the right (see Figure 1), where:
i− =
½
bic − f(i) if i ∈ [bic,bic + 1
2)
bic + f(i) if i ∈ [bic + 1
2,bic +1 ) and i+ = i− +1 (1)











¯ ¯ − gt(i) c (3)
Where c is the cost of altruism and c>0.
Remember that an Altruist provides a public good that supplies one unit of
utility to those who receive its beneﬁts. Moreover, at the end of each period,
after consuming a public good that is available, and bearing the provision costs
(in the case of Altruists), each agent then decides, according to a learning rule,
whether he wishes to be an Altruist or Egoist during the next period.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the following average payoﬀs, after that we will specify the
learning rule:















gt(w) Πt(w) dw if
¯ ¯V A
t (i)
¯ ¯ > 0
(4)
3Obviously, the function gt(w) is no continuous in general. Nevertheless, as it is bounded,
if we assume that it has a ﬁnite number of discontinuity points in any ﬁnite interval, then the















(1 − gt(w)) Πt(w) dw if
¯ ¯V A
t (i)
¯ ¯ < 1
(5)
We consider the following functions to make the learning rule that determines
the population’s dynamics more precise:
• If we consider LRM
t (i), then the agents follow the learning rule in which




1 if ¯ ΠA
t (i) − ¯ ΠE
t (i) > 0
0 otherwise (6)
• If we consider LRP
t (i), then the agents follow the learning rule in which










t (i) − Πt(i))(1 − gt(i)) > 0
0 otherwise
(7)
The following equation represents the dynamic of the system.
If we assume the agents are following the learning rule LRM




If we assume the agents are following the learning rule LRP




As we have already mentioned, we ﬁrst do the analysis assuming that the
agents follow the learning rule LRM
t . We then repeat the analysis, but assuming
that they follow the learning rule LRP
t .
In the following section, we analyse a speciﬁc cohesion function, i.e., the
linear cohesion function and the parameter that we will use to measure the
group cohesion.
2.4 Linear cohesion function and the measure of group
cohesion.
Although considering a linear cohesion function might be rather simple, never-




d) if h ∈ [0, 1
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x(1 − 1−h
d ) if h ∈ [1
2,1)
where h = FrationalPart[i]
(8)








































Figure 2: Linear cohesion function f(h) with external depth x = 1
4,i n t e r n a ld e p t h
d = 1
3. The vertical axis represents the value of the cohesion function and the hori-
zontal axis represents (without loss of generality) the individuals of group G0, i.e., the
interval [0,1).
We now brieﬂy describe the relationship between the payoﬀs of the mem-
bers of an Altruist group4 and the diﬀerent linear cohesion functions ( a linear
cohesion function is determined by the parameters x and d).
We ﬁrst focus on the role of the parameter x. It is straightforward to show
that, for any strategy proﬁle of the two neighboring groups of an Altruist group:
the smaller x (the external depth) is, the greater the payoﬀso ft h em e m b e r so f
the Altruist group will be (they might even be equal, but never lower). Con-
versely, as x increases, the Altruist’s payoﬀs either reduce or stay unchanged.
When we consider an Egoist group, the relationship between the payoﬀsa n d
the parameter x will be, obviously, the opposite case. Thus, a smaller external
depth x will be more beneﬁcial to the Altruist groups and a high x will be more
beneﬁcial to the Egoist groups.
Furthermore, the relationship between the degree of cohesion and the pa-
rameter x is quite clear. The greater the external depth x is, the weaker the
group-cohesion will be. We can therefore state that in the framework of homo-
geneous groups, high levels of cohesion are good for Altruist groups and negative
for Egoist groups.
With regard to the internal depth, d, we have a similar outcome as in the
case of the external depth, x, i.e., a similar relationship between the payoﬀso f
4By the term “Altruist group” we denote a group in which all its members are altruists.and Altruist or Egoist group and the parameter d. One interesting characteristic
of the parameter d is the following; if d increases, more agents will be able to
observe activities that take place outside their own group. Thus, the internal
depth (d) determines how many people are able to observe activities outside their
group, and the external depth (x) determines how many people from outside
the group can be observed by those in the group who can observe. From an
individual agent’s point of view, a small portion of his neighborhood that lying
outside his group is (in general) not very important for his interaction and his
payoﬀs, although it might be very important for the learning process.
When we consider d = 1
2, we note that every individual agent is able to
observe someone from the closest adjacent group. This seems to be the best
scenario for the spread of strategies throughout the population. As such, for
the sake of simplicity, we assume that d = 1
2 in the following section. We could
certainly do an analysis for any d, but that would only make the analysis more
complex, and the outcome would be quite the same as that for the simpler
analysis.
From now on we consider d = 1
2, therefore, the parameter x will be the
measure of group cohesion.N o t e t h a t i f x ' 0 then the groups are almost
isolated, in fact if x =0then there is not local interaction and the group
are independent, in that case the group cohesion is maximal. If we consider
greater x, the group cohesion decreases, thus the group members have more
neighbors outside of his group to interact with and learn from. If x takes the
maximum value, x =1 /2, then the group cohesion is minimal and the group
has no signiﬁcance, in that case we have a classical local interaction model in
one dimension, like the ring of the Ellison(1993) model and Eshel5 et al. (1998),
where the agents has the same number of neighbors on the right side that on
t h el e f ts i d e .S e et h eF i g u r e3.
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Figure 3: We represent the interaction-learning neighbourhood of agent i (normal
brackets) and agent j (dot brackets) for three diﬀerent values of x, i.e., three levels of
group cohesion. The agents i and j belong to group G0 in light grey. The smaller x
is, the greater the level of group cohesion is.
5The only diﬀerence is that we consider a continuum population whereas they consider a
discrete population.Therefore we identify the parameter x with the level of group cohesion.
On the one hand, high levels of group cohesion prove to be beneﬁcial for
the persistence of an Altruist group. On the other hand, however, low levels
of group-cohesion prove to be beneﬁcial for the spreading of a given sort of
behavior within a population, and whilst this might be conducive to the spread-
ing of altruism, it would also be suitable for the spreading of egoism as well.
It is therefore not clear, as yet, what precise scenario would prove to be the
most beneﬁcial setting for the persistence and spread of altruism throughout a
population.
In the following section, we do a detailed analysis to identify the best condi-
tions for the persistence and spread of altruism, (i.e., the level of group-cohesion
that favours altruism in a population).
3A n a l y s i s
As we assumed in the previous section, we consider (from no on) only lineal
cohesion functions with d =1 /2. Therefore, the group cohesion is give by the
parameter x ∈ (0, 1
2]. In addition, we consider populations with homogeneous
groups as initial states. As such, all of the agents in a given group follow the
same strategy at t =0 . We can thus talk about Altruist and/or Egoist groups
at t =0 . Such an assumption simpliﬁes matters and is not too artiﬁcial either6.
We can consider that our groups have undergone some previous evolution before
joining the global population. Generally, the evolution of an isolated group
tends to homogenize its behavior, if we consider a uniform interaction. It seems
reasonable to suppose that most groups will be egoistic, although a few of them
(or maybe just one) might be altruistic. We can then ask if one (or a few)
altruistic groups could persist in a global population (of mainly Egoists groups)
and if it (of they) might even be able to spread their altruism throughout the
entire population. Moreover, if the Altruism was able to persist and even spread,
then we would want to know which level of group cohesion is the better for this.
In an eﬀort to answer such questions, we do the following analysis: We ﬁrst
want to know the values of the parameters c and x (i.e., the cost of altruism
and the degree of group-cohesion7) that permits the persistence, spread and/or
predominance of altruism.
To this aim, we study the long-run behavior of the population in three
diﬀerent initial scenarios:
• Scenario A: A predominantly egoistic population with just one Altruist
group, from which we determine the conditions (values of c and x)f o r
6In the next section, using simulations, we relax this assumption and increase the set of
initial states.
7As we have already mention the parameter x is a good measure of the level of group-
cohesion. With x ' 0, we have an almost-isolated group and the greatest interaction of any
agent is with the members of his own group. With x = 1
2,w em a k et h eg r o u p si n e s s e n t i a l
and we have a classical local-interaction model in one dimension population. Therefore, we
can identify the parameter x with the level of group-cohesion.altruism to persist and spread throughout the egoistic population. The
relationship between the persistence and spread of altruism and the cost
altruism is quite clear. The greater the cost the more diﬃcult it is for
altruism to persist and spread. What is not so clear, however, is the
relationship between group-cohesion and the persistence and spread of
altruism.
• Scenario B: A predominantly altruistic population with just one Egoist
group, from which we determine the conditions (values of c and x)f o rt h e
sole Egoist group to be driven to extinction.
• Scenario C: A population of Altruists with two Egoist groups from which
we determine the conditions for the Egoist groups to be driven to extinc-
tion.
Therefore, for the values of c (cost of altruism) and x (level of group-
cohesion) that support all of the above conditions, we can verify the following
statement: For such values of x and c, if we consider any initial state with only
homogeneous groups and with at least one Altruist group, the entire population
will follow the altruistic strategy in the long run.
3.1 The learning rule LRM.
We now determine the values of c and x that support the above conditions,
p r o v i d e dt h e s ev a l u e se x i s t . W ea s s u m et h a ta l la g e n t su s et h el e a r n i n gr u l e
LRM,a sd e ﬁned in (6).
3.1.1 Scenario A: An Altruist group in a world of Egoists.
In period t =0there is the following initial state: Without loss of generality,
we consider that Group G0 =[ 0 ,1) to be the Altruist group and the remaining
groups are egoistic, see Figure 4.
The individual payoﬀs are zero for the whole population, apart from the
Altruists in G0 and the Egoists closest to the boundary of G0 and who have
altruistic neighbors. Obviously, the smaller the cohesion of the group is, the
greater the Altruists’ payoﬀs and the smaller the Egoists payoﬀsw i l lb e . I n
such a context, cohesion only changes with the parameter x.A sw en e x tp r o v e
with Condition A1, the greater the cost of altruism (c) is, the smaller x must be
for altruism to persist in the next period, (i.e., the greater the group-cohesion
must be).
We next calculate conditions (values of c and x) under which the group of
Altruist persists (Condition A1). After that, we calculate the values of c and x
under which the Altruism of this group could spread to the entire population
(Condition A2 an A3).-1               -1/2                  0                  1/2                1     3/2                 2                              
G-1 G0                         G1
iR ∈ -1               -1/2                  0                  1/2                1     3/2                 2                              
G-1 G0                         G1
iR ∈
Figure 4: The group G0 =[ 0 ,1) is the Altruist group (light grey), the remainder
groups are egoistic.
Condition A1:A tt =1 , Altruists continue being Altruists. Here, we
calculate the values of c and x that make Altruists continue being Altruists in
the following period.
Since we are in a symmetric scenario, we only need to consider the Altruists
in (0, 1
2),s e eF i g u r e4. The average payoﬀs observed by the Altruist i who is
located in (0, 1


























f(w) dw > 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2)
(A1)
Therefore, if A1 holds the altruist group continues being altruistic.
Using the linear cohesion function given by (8), condition A1 is equivalent




For the values of c and x that hold this expression a group of Altruists
surrounded by Egoists continue being Altruist.
The above expression describes an inverse relationship between the cost of
altruism (c) and the parameter (x), which is the parameter that measures group-
cohesion. Thus, the lower the cohesion of the group is (or the higher x is), the
lower the cost of altruism must be to guarantee the persistence of an altruistic








Figure 5: We represent the function c =1− 3x
2
Condition A2:A t t =1 , an egoistic observer of altruism will want
to become an Altruist. Now, we must only concentrate on the egoistic
observers of altruism in group G−1 (left of G0), the other group G1 (right of
G0) is in the same situation, see Figure 4.S i n c e d = 1
2, the Egoists in the
interval (−1
2,0) will observe Altruists in Group G0. Note that these Egoists
have neighbors in group G0, therefore, have altruistic neighbors.
We calculate the values of c and x that would encourage such Egoists become
Altruists in the following period.




































f(w) dw > 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2)
(A2)
It is straightforward to prove that if (A1) holds then (A2) holds, since 1
2 ≤
1 − f(i).
8Note that we can always relocate or transfer this condition to the interval (0, 1
2), because
of the characteristics of the function f(i).Let A10 be the same condition as A1, but with a "smaller than" sign in the
expression of the condition, i.e. ¯ ΠA
t (i) − ¯ ΠE
t (i) < 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2),a n d
analogously A20.
Remark 2 Note that, if A20 holds then A10 also holds. Therefore, if A20 holds,
altruism will then vanishes completely from the population.
Using the linear cohesion function given by (8),t h ec o n d i t i o nA2 is equivalent












Figure 6: We represent the function c =1− 5x
4
Therefore, on the one hand, if c<1− 5x
4 then an egoistic observer of altruism
will become Altruist. On the other hand, if c>1− 5x
4 then the altruism vanishes
completely from the population
Condition A3:A t t =2 , the agents in the half-altruistic and half-
egoistic group will want to be Altruists. Thus, in period t =1 ,i fA1
holds, then the whole group, G0, continues to be altruistic and half of the
members of the adjacent groups, G−1 and G1, change to altruism, see Figure 7.
Since both adjacent groups are under the same situation, we arbitrarily choose
Group G−1 for our study. We ﬁrst study the altruistic interval (−1
2,0) and
the conditions for the Altruists to continue being so, and then the conditions





to change to altruism.
Now, the group-cohesion seems to work against the Altruists of G−1.T h e
greater the group-cohesion is, the smaller the payoﬀs of such Altruists and the
greater the payoﬀso ft h eE g o i s t si nG−1 are. However, in this framework, if the
level of cohesion increases, the Altruists’ neighborhoods penetrate further into
the Egoists’ zone, (i.e., they have more Egoists and less Altruists as neighbors).
Thus, they observe more Egoists. This could encourage altruism, since the
average payoﬀs of Egoists could decrease. The reason for this, the decrease in
the Egoists’ payoﬀsa st h e ym o v ea w a yf r o ma l t r u i s m .-1               -1/2                  0                  1/2                1     3/2                 2                             
G-1 G0                         G1
iR ∈ -1               -1/2                  0                  1/2                1     3/2                 2                             
G-1 G0                         G1
iR ∈
Figure 7: At t =1 ,i fA1 holds, the whole group G0 continues being Altruist and
half of the adjacent groups G−1 and G1 change to altruism.
To clarify this latter point we focus on the opposite case, i.e., the group-
cohesion decreases (i.e. x increases), in that case, there might be two diﬀerent
reactions:
• On the one hand, the payoﬀsf o rA l t r u i s t si nG−1 increase and the payoﬀs
for Egoists in G−1 decrease, which works in favour of altruism.
• On the other hand, an altruist in G−1 observes fewer Egoists in his neigh-
borhood but notices that those Egoists obtain high payoﬀs because they
are very close to Altruists, thus, the average payoﬀso ft h eE g o i s t sm i g h t
increase. It could be that this increase of the average Egoist’s pay-oﬀ was
higher than that of the average altruist in that neighborhood. An agent
would have therefore incentives to change to egoism if group-cohesion de-
creases, which works in favour of egoism.
That trade-oﬀ makes the upper bound of the next suﬃcient condition con-
c a v ea n dw i t ham a x i m u m .
Altruists in Group G−1. The average payoﬀs observed by the Altruists
w h ob e l o n gt o(−1













+ f(w) − c) dw +
f(i) Z
0
































f(w) dw > 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2)
(A3a)Egoists in Group G−1. The average payoﬀs observed by the Egoists who
belong to (−1,−1













































f(w) dw > 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2)
(A3e)
Therefore A3a ≡ A3e = A3.
Using the linear cohesion function given by (8), condition A3 is equivalent





For the values of c and x that hold this expression the agents in the half-
altruistic and half-egoistic group will want to be Altruists.






























Figure 8: We represent the function c =m i n {x,
2x(1−x2)
1+2x } with a thick line, it has a
maximum at the point ˜ x ∼ = 0.455The expression min{x,
2x(1−x2)
1+2x } is concave and has a maximum at the point
˜ x ' 0.455. Therefore, the highest cost, c, that is compatible with the spreading
of altruism is achieved with an intermediate level of cohesion, see Figure 8.
Note that, if A1 and A3 hold, at t =2the groups G0 G−1 G1 will be Altruist,
at t =3half of the members of groups G−2 and G2 will also be Altruist, at
t =4groups G0 G−1 G1 G−2 G2 will be Altruist, the process continues spreading
Altruism throughout the entire population.
Now, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let f(i) be a cohesion function, LRM be the learning rule and
d = 1
2 in an initial Egoist population with a group of Altruists. If A1,a n dA3
hold, then altruism will spread throughout the entire population.
Corollary 4 Let f(i) be a linear cohesion function, LRM be the learning rule
and d = 1




1+2x }, altruism will spread throughout the entire population.
In Figure 9 we plot the previous expression.


























1+2x } with a thick line, below this line the altruism spreads
throughout the entire population. This line has a maximum at the point ˜ x ∼ = 0.416.
Therefore, the highest cost, c, that is compatible with the spreading of Altruism is
achieved with an intermediate level of cohesion.
3.1.2 Scenario B: One Egoist group in a world of Altruists.
We now consider a diﬀerent initial state and work just as before, except that
now we calculate the conditions to drive an Egoist group into extinction. In
period t =0there is the following state: Without loss of generality, we considerthat Group G0 =[ 0 ,1) is an Egoist group in a population in which all the
other groups are altruistic, see Figure 10. The individual payoﬀsa r e1 − c for
the whole population, apart from the Egoists in G0 and the Altruists who are
closest to the boundary of G0 and who have egoistic neighbors.
Obviously, the weaker the group-cohesion is, the greater the Egoists’ payoﬀs
will be and the smaller those of the Altruists9 will be. Thus, we can expect that,
t h eg r e a t e rt h ec o s to fa l t r u i s m( c) is, the smaller x must be to make egoism
vanish, (i.e., the greater the group-cohesion must be).
-1               -1/2                  0                  1/2                1     3/2                 2                             i
G-1 G0                         G1
iR ∈ -1               -1/2                  0                  1/2                1     3/2                 2                             i
G-1 G0                         G1
iR ∈
Figure 10: At t =0 ,G r o u pG0 =[ 0 ,1) is the Egoist group (dark grey) , the rest of
the groups are Altruists (light grey)
Condition B1: Egoists want to be Altruists. We now focus Egoists and
calculate the values of c and x that are required to make them become Altruists
in the following period.



























f(w) dw > 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2)
(B1)
As we can clearly see, this condition is equal to A1,t h u s A1 ≡ B1.
Condition B2: Altruistic observer of egoism want to continue being
Altruists. We now concentrate on the altruistic observer of egoism in Group
G−1 (left to G0). The other group, G1 (right to G0), is in the same situation,
see Figure 10.S i n c e d = 1
2, the Altruists in the interval (−1
2,0) will observe
Egoists in Group G0.









































f(w) dw > 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2)
(B2)
As we can see, that condition is equal to A2,t h u sA2 ≡ B2
Therefore, since A1 ⇒ A2, if A1 holds, a single group of Egoists surrounded
by Altruist groups will become altruistic in just one period.
3.1.3 Scenario C: Two neighboring Egoist groups in a world of Al-
truists.
We also need to contemplate this scenario for the following reason; If Conditions
A1 and A3 hold, a string of egoistic groups surrounded by Altruist groups drops
to a single group of Egoists, (provided that the string contains an even number
of egoistic groups), which later disappears. If the string contains an odd number
of Egoist groups, however, it then drops to two adjacent Egoist groups. In the
following sub-section, we study the condition under which these two remaining
Egoist groups also disappear.
For this purpose, we now consider the following initial state: In period t =0
there is the following state: Without loss of generality, we consider that Groups
G0 =[ 0 ,1) and G1 =[ 1 ,2) are Egoist groups and the remaining groups are all
altruistic, see Figure 11. The payoﬀs of the individual members of the population
are 1 − c each, except for the Egoists in G0,a n dG1 and the Altruists that are
closest to the left boundary of G0 and those closest to the right boundary of G1.
Obviously, the weaker the group-cohesion is, the smaller the Altruists’ payoﬀs10
and the higher the Egoists’ payoﬀs will be.
In period t =0the groups are in a scenario that is equivalent to the Scenario
A. Thus, if A1 holds, we can then state that in period t =1the whole population
is altruistic, apart from the agents in (1
2, 3
4) who continue being Egoists, since
they have not observed any Altruists in period t =0 ,s e eF i g u r e11.
Since both groups (G0 and G1) are under the same situation in period t =1 ,
we study Group G0 =[ 0 ,1). That group has a half [0, 1
2) being Altruists and
10Evidently, of those who have Egoistic neighbors.the other half [1
2,1) being Egoists. Next, we study the condition to change, in
period t =2 ,t ot h ew h o l eg r o u pb e i n ga l t r u i s t i c .
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Figure 11: In period t =0 , Groups G0 =[ 0 ,1) and G1 =[ 1 ,2) are Egoists groups
(dark grey), the remainder groups are Altruists group (light grey). In period t =1 ,
if conditions A1 holds, both groups (G0,G 1) will be in the same situation, e.g. ,the
group G0 =[ 0 ,1) has a half [0, 1
2) being Altruists and the other half [1
2,1) being
Egoists
Condition C1: Altruists want to continue being Altruists. The average
payoﬀs observed by the Altruists who belong to (0, 1















































f(w) dw > 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2)
(C1)
As we can see, that condition is equal to A3, C1 ≡ A3
Condition C2: Observer Egoist of altruism want to change to altruism.
The average payoﬀso b s e r v e db yt h eE g o i s t sw h ob e l o n gt o(1







































f(w) dw > 0 for all i ∈ (0, 1
2)
(C2)
Using the linear cohesion function given by (8), the condition C2 is equivalent
to:
c<
x +2 x2 − 4x3
1+2 x
The expression x+2x2−4x3
1+2x is concave and has a maximum at the point ˜ x ∼ =
0.427, so we have a situation that is similar to Condition A3 when we consider
a linear cohesion function.
In fact, the previous expression is more restrictive that the condition A3 and
A1 when we consider a linear cohesion function. It is straightforward to prove
that if c<x+2x2−4x3
1+2x ,t h e nc<min{1 − 3x
2 ,x,
2x(1−x2)
1+2x } we can see this by
plotting those expressions, see Figure 12.
Therefore,if we have any initial population with homogeneous groups, the
scenarios A, B and C that we have considered reﬂect any situation the individ-
uals of those groups could face during the ﬁrst period. We can therefore state
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Let f(i) be a cohesion function, LRM t h el e a r n i n gr u l ea n d
d = 1
2 in any initial population of homogeneous groups of which at least one
group is Altruistic. If A1, A3 and C2 hold, then altruism will spread throughout
t h ee n t i r ep o p u l a t i o n .
Corollary 6 Let f(i) be a linear cohesion function, LRM t h el e a r n i n gr u l ea n d
d = 1
2 in any initial population of homogeneous groups of which at least one
group is Altruistic. If c<x+2x2−4x3
1+2x , then altruism will spread throughout the
entire population.
For any group homogeneous initial state with at least one group of Altruists,
we know what will happen, in the long run, in two regions of Figure 13 (linear














maximum at the point ˜ x ∼ = 0.427, so that the highest cost c that is compatible with
the spreading of altruism is only achievable with an intermediate level of cohesion.
• In the region where C2 holds (i.e., in the linear case when c<x+2x2−4x3
1+2x ),
altruism eventually spreads throughout the population. Furthermore, an
intermediate level of group cohesion is the best scenario for the spread of
altruism.
• In the region where A20 holds ( i.e., in the linear case when c>1 − 5
4x)
egoism eventually spreads throughout the population.
In the other region ( Region III in Figure 13), however, we have no idea of
what will happen in the long run, so we shall perform some simulations to verify
whether our suﬃcient conditions are also necessary conditions. Before doing the
simulations, however, we ﬁrst repeat the previous analysis for the other learning
rule.






























Figure 13: We already know what happens in the regions where either C2 or A2
0
hold, but regarding the other region (Region III), however, we have no idea of what
happens in the long run.3.2 The learning rule LRP.
We now assume the agents uses the learning rule LRP,a sd e ﬁned in 7.
In repeating the previous analysis, we obtain the analogous suﬃcient con-
ditions when the learning rule compares average pay-oﬀ with one’s own. The
relationships among those conditions11 are, under the learning rule LRP the
following:
A1P ≡ A2P ≡ B1P and A3P
a ≡ A3P
e ≡ B2P ≡ C1P ≡ C2P
Where the conditions A1P and A3P = A3P
a are:
¯ ΠA






















Using the linear cohesion function given by (8), the condition A1P and A3P
are respectively equivalent to:




W h e r et h es e c o n do n ei sm o r er e s t r i c t i v et h a nt h eﬁrst one.
Therefore, with this learning rule we obtain the following propositions:
Proposition 7 Let f(i) be a cohesion function, LRP the learning rule, d = 1
2
and any initial group homogeneous population with at least one Altruist group. If
A1P and A3P hold , then altruism will spread throughout the entire population.
Corollary 8 Let f(i) be a linear cohesion function, LRP the learning rule,
d = 1
2 and any initial group homogeneous population with at least one Altruist
group. If c<x
2 then the altruism spreads to the whole population.
11Where, e.g. A1P is equivalent to Condition A1, but we consider the learning rule LRP
instead of LRM.4 Simulation
The purpose of simulations is to check the robustness of the analytical results,
ﬁrst we examine if our suﬃcient conditions for spreading Altruism are also
necessary conditions. After that, we give up the assumption of considering
populations of homogeneous groups as initial states. Thus, we consider a broader
set of initial states, where there could be Altruists and Egoists in the same group
at t =0 .
To make simulations we use a discrete version of the theoretical model. We
consider a ring in which there are K groups with N individuals each, giving us a
total of KN agents in the ring. Moreover, there are no agents at the boundaries
and N is an even number. The distance between two adjacent agents is e = 1
N.
4.1 Are our suﬃcient conditions also necessary conditions?
In the previous sections, we have identiﬁed suﬃcient conditions for the persis-
tence and spread of altruism. We could ask ourselves, however, whether such
conditions are also necessary. In other words, what happen in Region III of
Figure 13.
As initial state, we consider a population with just one group of Altruists
among other groups of Egoists, and a linear cohesion function with d = 1
2.







50},i fx = 25
50 = 1
2 the groups then have minimal cohesion and if
x = 1
50 they then have maximal cohesion. After specifying values for (c,x),w e
then ran the system until convergence was achieved. In the long run, there are
three possible outcomes: the population may become either totally altruistic or
entirely egoistic, or both types of behavior may persist.
In the following two sections, we present the results of this simulation for
the two diﬀerent learning rules.
4.1.1 Linear cohesion function, d = 1
2 and the learning rule LRM
As we can see in Figure 14 we obtained results that were quite similar to the
ones previously obtained in the analytic approach, see Figure 9.
As we consider an even number of groups, the suﬃcient conditions for the





see Figure 9. Theoretical analysis predicts that in the region given by this ex-
pression the Altruism spread throughout the entire population12.
In the results of the simulation, we can see what happens in the region that
we did not study in the analytical approach. In the long run, we have both
kinds of behavior, altruism and egoism, in this region, see Figure 14. Altruism
is able to persist but it never dominates. Therefore, we verify that our suﬃcient
conditions are also necessary conditions for the spreading of altruism throughout
t h ee n t i r ep o p u l a t i o n ,i nt h i sc a s e .
12We also now that the population becomes egoistic in c<1 − 5x






















Figure 14: With K =4and N =4 0 . The vertical axis represent the Altruist’s
cost c ∈ { 1
50, 2
50,..., 50




50} ,w h e nx = 1
2 minimal cohesion and x = 1
50 maximal cohesion. In the
axes only appear the numerator of the value, e.g. if x = 1
50 then in the axis appears
the number 1. Black color represents that the whole population under this conditions
( c and x values) becomes egoistic in the long run, light grey altruistic, the other color
(dark grey) both behaviors persist.
4.1.2 Linear cohesion function, d = 1
2 and the learning rule LRP
Regarding the previous section we only changed the learning rule, instead of
LRM we used LRP,s e eF i g u r e15.
In that case, we also obtained results that were quite similar to the ones
previously obtained in the analytic approach. Moreover, the interpretation of
the previous simulation is equally applicable to this one.
4.2 A broader set of initial states.
In the previous sections we have studied the long-run behavior for a subset of
initial states, i.e., we have only considered populations made up of homogeneous
groups as initial states. We could verify the robustness of our previous results
by considering any initial state, i.e., a population that can have heterogeneous
groups (with both Altruists and Egoists in each group), into this population we
can then plant just one homogeneous group of Altruists like a seed.
Thus, when considering a heterogeneous population, if a group becomes
altruistic or if a homogeneous group of Altruists is added to such a population,
we might well ask ourselves:
Will altruism persist as it did in the previous analysis? Would it spread
throughout the entire population? And if the answer is yes, what is the level of
group cohesion better for that? In short, we will know if the previous analytical






















Figure 15: This ﬁgure has the same interpretation as Figure14, however, we now
consider the learning rule LRP instead of LRM.
To this aim, we consider the initial state of a heterogeneous population with
just one group of Altruists and with the behavior of the remaining individuals
in the others groups being randomly chosen (at t =0 ). Thus, there will be
groups with agents following diﬀerent behaviors, heterogeneous groups, in the
initial state.







40},i fx = 20
40 = 1
2 the groups then have minimal cohesion and if
x = 1
40 they then have maximal cohesion. After specifying values for (c,x),
we then ran the system until convergence was achieved. In the long run, there
are three possible outcomes: the population may become either totally altruis-
tic or entirely egoistic, or both types of behavior may persist. We repeat the
experiment 100 times for each pair of {c,x},w i t hd i ﬀerent randomly chosen
initial states. We then compute the rate of the three diﬀerent possible situa-
tions in the long run. We obtain three values (va,v m,v e) for each pair {c,x},
with va + vm + ve =1and vi ∈ (0,1) for i = a,e,m. These ratios can be
taken as an estimation of the size of the three diﬀerent basins of attraction, e.g.
(va,v m,v e)=( 0 .8,0.03,0.17) the system becames entirely altruistic 80 times in
the simulation, entirely egoistic 17 times and mixed 3 times.
In the following two sections, we present the results of this simulation for
the two diﬀerent learning rules.
4.2.1 Linear cohesion function, d = 1
2 and the learning rule LRM
In this section we consider a linear cohesion function with d = 1
2, the learning
rule LRM, K =3and N =2 0 .
As there are three values linked to each pair (c,x),r e ﬂecting the results of
the simulation, we show one ﬁgure for each value. Thus, we have three ﬁgures.
The ﬁrst one represents va, i.e., the ratio of times the system became entirely
altruistic, see Figure 16. The second one represents vm, i.e., the ratio of thetimes the system maintains a mixed behavior, see Figure 17. The third one
represents ve, i.e., the ratio of the times the system became entirely egoistic, see
Figure 18.
As we can clearly see, an intermediate level of cohesion is the scenario that is
most conducive to Altruism. Thus, the highest cost, c, that is compatible with
the spreading of altruism is achieved with an intermediate level of cohesion.
Therefore, the results are quite similar to those of the analytical approach,
which means that our results are robust enough.





















horizontal axis represents the level of cohesion x ∈ { 1
40, 2
40,..., 20
40},w h e nx = 20
40 = 1
2
minimal cohesion and when x = 1
40 maximal cohesion. In the axes only appear the
numerator of the value, e.g. if x = 1
40 then in the axis appears the number 1.T h e
ﬁgure represents va the number of times the system became entirely altruistic in the
long run. The black zones in the graph, va =1 , mean that under these conditions
(those c and x values) the system always became entirely altruistic, i.e. the 100
times that we ran the system. The white zones, va =0 , mean that it never became
entirely altruistic under these conditions (c,x).T h e g r e a t e r va is, therefore, the
darker the shade of grey and the system became entirely altruistic more frequently in
our simulations. As we can clearly see, an intermediate level of cohesion is the scenario
that is most conducive to Altruism. Thus, the highest cost, c, that is compatible with

















Figure 17: It represents vm the number of times the system permits both types of
behaviour, altruistic and egoistic, to persist in the long run. The black zones in the
graph, vm =1 , mean that under these conditions (the c and x values) the system
always converged to an heterogeneous state with altruist and egoists, i.e., the 100 times
that we ran the system. The white zones, va =0 , mean that it never converged to
a mixed or heterogeneous state in the long run under these conditions (c,x),i nt h a t
case, the system became entirely altruistic or egoistic. The greater va is, therefore, the
darker the shade of grey and the system converge to a mixed or heterogeneous state

















Figure 18: It represents ve the number of times the system became entirely egoistic in
the long run. The black zones in the graph, ve =1 , mean that under these conditions
(the c and x values) the system always became entirely egoistic, i.e., the 100 times
that we ran the system. The white zones, ve =0 , mean that it never became entirely
egoistic under these conditions (c,x).T h eg r e a t e rve is, therefore, the darker the shade
of grey and the system became entirely egoistic more frequently in our simulations.
4.2.2 Linear cohesion function, d = 1
2 and the learning rule LRP
We shall now repeat the exercise, but with a change of learning rule, we consider
LRP instead of LRM.S e eF i g u r e s19, 20, 21.
In conclusion, with previous simulations, we have therefore veriﬁed that
our results are robust in broader settings, that an intermediate level of cohesion
seems to be the best scenario for the fostering of altruism, i.e., the concept of
“the group” or a certain division in the population fosters altruism, although
such division or fragmentation should be not too great.
On the other hand, we observe that the learning rule LRP is somewhat
less favorable for altruism, since the weight that an individual’s own payoﬀ has
in this rule is greater than in LRM.N o t e t h a t u n d e r LRM, the individual’s
own payoﬀ has the same weight in the learning rule as any other payoﬀ in the

















Figure 19: It represents va the number of times the system became entirely altruistic
in the long run. This ﬁgure has the same interpretation as the ﬁgure 16.A sw ec a n
clearly see, an intermediate level of cohesion is the scenario that is most conducive to
Altruism.

















Figure 20: It represents vm the number of times the system permitted both types of
behaviour, altruistic and egoistic, to persist in the long run. This ﬁgure has the same

















Figure 21: It represents ve the number of times the system became entirely egoistic
in the long run. This ﬁgure has the same interpretation as the ﬁgure 18.
4.3 Non-Linear cohesion function with x = 1
2, d = 1
2 and
the learning rule LRM.
In addition, we also examine what happens when we consider a non-linear co-
hesion function.
For example, the function f(h)=x(1− hn
dn) with n ∈ (0,1).I fn =1then we
have a linear cohesion function. The smaller n i st h em o r ec o n v e xf(i) will be.
As such, if n decreases, the cohesion increases, see Figure 22.I no r d e rt od ot h e
simulations, we take x = 1
2 and d = 1
2 and use the parameter n as a measure of
group cohesion. The smaller the parameter n is, the greater the group cohesion
is , with ∈ (0,1).
We consider as initial state a population with only one group of Altruists
surrounded by egoistic groups. Numerical analysis was conducted for a sizable






50}. After specifying values for
(c,n) we then ran the system until convergence was achieved. In the long run,
there are three possible outcomes: the population may become either totally
altruistic or entirely egoistic, or both types of behavior may persist.
As we can see from Figure 23, we obtain similar results to those obtained
for the linear case. An intermediate level of cohesion is the best scenario for the








































Figure 22: We represent two non-linear cohesion functions (f(h)) both of them with
x = 1
2 and d = 1
2. However, one of the function with n =0 .2 and the other one
with n =0 .9 . The latter one is almost a linear cohesion function. The vertical
axis represents the value of the cohesion function and the horizontal axis represents
(without loss of generality) the individuals of group G0, i.e., the interval [0,1).






















Figure 23: With K =4and N =4 0 . The vertical axis represent the Altruist’s
cost c ∈ { 1
50, 2
50,..., 50




50} ,w h e nn = 50
50 =1minimal cohesion and when n = 1
50 maximal
cohesion. In the axes only appear the numerator of the value, e.g. if n = 1
50 then
in the axis appears the number 1. Black color represents that the whole population
under this conditions ( c and n values) becomes Egoistic in the long run, light grey
Altruistic, the other color (dark grey) both behaviors persist.5C O N C L U S I O N S
In this paper we have introduced and parameterized the concept of “group co-
hesion” in a model of local interaction with a population divided into groups.
This allows us to control the level of “isolation” of these groups. We thus ana-
lyze if the degree of group cohesion is relevant to achieve an eﬃcient behavior
and which level would be the best one for this purpose. We are interested in
situations where there is a trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and individual incentives.
This trade oﬀ is stronger when the eﬃcient strategy or norm is strictly domi-
nated, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma or in some cases of Altruism. In our model
we have considered that agents could choose to be Altruist or Egoist, in fact,
they behave as in Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998) model.
We ﬁnd that:
• The concept of group cohesion plays and important role even in local-
interaction models.
• We verify that an intermediate level of group-cohesion is the best sce-
nario for the spread of altruism, better than the classical local-interaction
scenario in which groups are inessential, and better than a scenario with
almost-isolated groups (i.e., high group cohesion). Therefore, a certain
level of fragmentation of the population into groups favours the persis-
tence and spread of altruism.
The agents behave in our model as in the model of Eshel, Samuelson and
Shaked (1998). However, we could have considered other situations where this
trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and individual incentives arises, as in a Prisoner
Dilemma or in some coordination games (where there is a trade oﬀ between the
eﬃciency strategy and the “risk dominant” strategy). We have the intuition
that a similar results would appear, but we will try to prove that point in future
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